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The Form and Content of 
Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) 
Philip A. Stadter 
KADING THE PENTECONT AETIA is both easy and difficult.1 The narrative runs rapidly, with little of Thucydides' 
customary density and grammatical strain, yet its prin-
ciples of arrangement and selection have remained obscure. 
Discussion has centered on two major difficulties: chronology 
and omissions. A. W. Gomme noted that the Pentecontaetia 
seems to share the very faults for which Thucydides criticized 
Hellanicus: it is both 1Ot<; xPOVOt<; OUK aKpt~£<; and ~paxu­
chronologically imprecise and brief.2 Explanations vary: to take 
two extremes, Russell Meiggs suggested that the excursus was 
1 From the enormous bibliography dealing with the Pentecontaetia, the 
following studies, in addition to standard commentaries and books on 
Thucydides and on the fifth century, have been most helpful or stimulating in 
the preparation of this paper: N. G. L. HAMMOND, "The Arrangement of the 
Thought in the Proem and in Other Parts of Thucydides I," CQ N.S. 2 (1952: 
hereafter 'Hammond') 127-41; H. D. WESTLAKE, "Thucydides and the 
Pentekontaetia," in Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History 
(Manchester 1969: 'Westlake') 39-60 (= CQ N.S. 5 [1955] 53-67); P. K. WALKER, 
"The Purpose and Method of 'the Pentekontaetia' in Thucydides, Book I," 
CQ N.S. 7 (1957: 'Walker') 27-38; R. A. McNEAL, "Historical Methods and 
Thucydides I.103.1," Historia 19 (1970: 'McNeal') 306-25; H. R. RAWLINGS, 
"Thucydides on the Purpose of the Delian League," Phoenix 31 (1977: 
'Rawlings') 1-8; and E. BADIAN, "Toward a Chronology of the Penetkontaetia 
down to the Renewal of the Peace of Callias," in From Plataea to Potidaea: 
Studies in the History and Historiography of the Pentecontaetia (Baltimore 
1993: 'Badian, From Plataea') 73-107 (=a revised version with new appendix 
of an article in EchCI23, N.S. 7 [1988: 'Badian (1988)'] 289-320), 125-62 
("Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. A Historian's 
Brief" [=a revised version of the article in J. W. Allison, ed., Conflict, 
Antithesis, and the Ancient Historian (Columbus [Ohio] 1990: 'Badian 
[1990]') 46-91, 165-81]). Badian, From Plataea xii, notes that "these essays 
have been revised (some of them considerably) for this collection, and they 
should not henceforth be cited in their original form." For the convenience of 
the reader who does not have access to the book, I give when possible the 
prior reference, recognizing that the new version is the authoritative text. 
2 A. W. GOMME et. al., A Historical Commentary on Thucydides (Oxford 
1956-78: hereafter' H CT') I 361; cf Thuc. 1.97.2. 
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"late and hurried and much less well digested than most of the 
history,"3 while Ernst Badian, starting from the assumption that 
Thucydides composed the excursus after the Peloponnesian 
War" in order to establish his thesis of Sparta's responsibility for 
the war and the correctness of Pericles' vision," has recently 
accused Thucydides of gross distortion of the historical record, 
through cunning omissions, innuendo, and outright falsifica-
tion.4 
Meiggs' position represents one version of that taken, more 
or less strongly, by most studies of the Pentacontaetia, that due 
to haste, disinterest, or some other reason, Thucydides failed to 
achieve his purpose in the Pentecontaetia. Badian instead grants 
that Thucydides achieved his purpose, but argues that the 
product represents "the perfect skill of the advocate claiming a 
passion for objectivity,"5 and therefore uses every deceptive 
trick of advocacy, especially omission and misdirection. An 
alternative hypothesis, however, is that what we have responds 
closely to what Thucydides wanted to say, as Badian suggests, 
and that the narrative as it stands represents accurately the true 
situation as Thucydides saw it. On this hypothesis, the features 
of the text were consciously chosen to reflect the clements that 
in his analysis Thucydides found particularly significant. To test 
the two propositions of this hypothesis, this article will examine 
the narrative techniques and principles of organization used in 
the excursus and relate them to the arguments found elsewhere 
in the work.6 I hope to show that the structure, chronology, 
and omissions are neither so unreasonable nor so deceptive as 
have been argued. In particular, the hypothesis that the ex-
cursus is incomplete as it stands must be questioned. Although 
the entire History as we have it is evidently unfinished, the 
completeness or not of the Pentecontaetia can only be deduced 
after a careful analysis of its internal features and their relation to 
the rest of the work. 
3 R. Meiggs, Athenian Empire (Oxford 1972) 445; cf Gomme, HCT I 362: 
"That the excursus is an early essay, provisional, unfinished, and never 
properly adapted to its present position, is to me clear." 
4 Badian, From Piataea 74 (= [1988] 291), cf 125-62. 
5 Badian, From Piataea 162 (=[1990] 91). 
6 Cf the studies of Thucydides' narrative technique by Hammond, Walker, 
and McNeal; cf C. J. Dewald, Taxis: The Organization of Thucydides' 
History, Books II-V II I (diss. University of California at Berkeley 1975). 
STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, 
Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 
PHILIP A. STADTER 37 
This reading will be based on indications in the text itself, 
without preconceptions as to what Thucydides should have 
written or meant to write. Such a reading is, precisely speaking, 
impossible, for all scholars carry their own prejudices and 
assumptions with them; but the effort will, I hope, uncover the 
rigorous principles underlying Thucydides' selection and pres-
entation. Examination will demonstrate the differences in func-
tion between the two major parts of the excursus that cause 
their different treatment and will reveal the focus, in the second 
part, on Athenian power as expressed in sieges and battles; this 
will place in a new context the lack of chronological precision 
and the omission of many items we might otherwise expect, 
and will expose the innumerable ties that bind the excursus to 
the rest of the work. The analysis does not attempt to present a 
history of the period (which would require a quite different 
method), but rather to set forth more accurately what, through 
inclusion and omission, the narrative conveys. 
First, however, an observation is necessary on the brevity of 
the excursus, so frequently cited as evidence of late composi-
tion or haste. In this view the ideal excursus would have been 
much fuller than what we now possess, maintaining the level of 
detail found in chapters 90-95 7 and rectifying the omission of 
major events, such as the transfer of the league treasury to 
Athens, the peace with Persia, and the ostracism of Thucydides 
son of Melesias. 8 Some items could have been added in brief 
compass. If the events of this period, however, had been 
described in the desired detail, the Pentecontaetia would have 
become a book, not seventeen pages, but three or four times as 
long. Thucydides treated the events of 479/478 quite selec-
tively, and still employed four and a half pages (1.89-95). Even at 
the more rapid pace of two pages per year, the period 479-439 
would have required 82 pages. 9 In Book I Thucydides deline-
ated the gathering storm, from the Epidamnian stasis to Athens' 
decision not to back down, setting the Pentecontaetia as an 
7 E.g. Gomme, HCT 1363. 
8 Meiggs (supra n.3) 444. Gomme has a list of omissions by categories: HCT 
1365-89. 
9 Cf Westlake 41. Book I runs to eighty-eight OCT pages. Diod. 11.38-
12.40 (478/477 to 439/438, including the Roman sections) occupies forty-five 
Teubner pages. Already the Pentecontaetia is second in length only to the 
Corcyraika (eighteen pages) of the units in Book I. The excursuses on the last 
years of Pausanias and Themistocles (1.128-38) require eight pages. 
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excursus within this account. The Pentecontaetia could not 
have been expanded without changing completely the pro-
portions and the character of his treatment and of the history as 
a whole. Herodotus explicitly took the beginning of his account 
back to Croesus, creating a richly-textured, multi-generational 
prolegomenon to the expedition of Xerxes. Thucydides chose a 
different method, and in referring to the Pentecontaetia as an 
ekbole indicated that it would be a subordinate unit in the 
overall structure. 10 
I. The Structure of the Pcntecontaetia 
The major structural units of the excursus are recognizable by 
the opening and closing off of topics through framing phrases 
or sentences, by the introduction of new topics with a name or 
temporal phrase, and by the insertion of authorial comments. 11 
The excursus as a whole is motivated by the statement at 87.6 
reporting the Spartan decision that the treaty had been broken, 
which is repeated in modified form at 88. The main narrative 
resumes with the repetition of this statement at 118.3 12 The 
explanation for this decision, the Spartan recognition that "they 
would gain even greater power," is stated generally at 88 and 
10 Thuc. 1.97.2. Polybius' two-bookproparaskeue exemplifies a different sort 
of introductory treatment: there is no indication that Thucydides had any 
such plan in mind, nor is it suggesed by his critics, who seem unaware of the 
structural problems expansion of the Pentecontaetia would create. 
lIOn framing sentences, "consisting of repeated introductory phrases or 
sentences at the beginnings of sections of the narrative, and of summary ones 
at the ends," see H. R. Immerwahr, Form and Thought in Herodotus 
(Cleveland 1966) 12 (from which the quotation), 52-58. They are not quite the 
same as the thesis-proof-restatement noted by Hammond. Cf also R. Katici(', 
"Die Ringkomposition im ersten Buche des Thukydideischen Geschichts-
werkes," WS 70 (1957) 179-96. Authorial comments arc direct interventions by 
the author into the narrative, as at 1.93.2: 1(at &!lAll iJ Ol1(OvOJlta ttl 1(at vuv 
EO'ttV 1('tA.. 
12 Thuc. 1.87.6: iJ OE OlaYVWJlll aihll 'tTj~ £1(1(A.lloia~, 'tou 'ta~ 01tOVOOe; A£AUO-
8at .... 88: E'I'l1q>tOav'to OE Ol Aa1(£OatJlOVlOl 'ta~ o1tovOa~ MAuo8m 1(at 1tO-
MJlll't£a dvat .... 118.3: au'tOle; JlEV 01)V 'tOle; Aa1(£OalJlOviOle; otiyvoxJ'to A£A.Uo-
Sat 't£ 'ta~ 01tOVOO~ 1(at 'toue; 'ASllVatOUe; ciOl1(£lV. References in the text arc to 
Book I unless otherwise specified. Translations are my own. 
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restated at 118.2.13 The increase of power that aroused Sparta's 
fear is thus presented as the subject of the excursus to follow. 
The excursus itself is introduced by yap (89.1).14 Chapter 88 is 
prefatory and represents Thucydides' insertion of his own in-
terpretation into his narrative. 15 Thucydides offers a second 
authorial intrusion into the text, this time in the first person, 16 in 
a second preface inserted at the transition between its two 
major sections (97.2). Here he reiterates that the excursus 
would provide an exposition of how the Athenian arche was es-
tablished. In addition, omission of the period by earlier writers 
(except for Hellanicus, who mentioned it briefly and without 
chronological precision) provides an additional justification for 
the long list of episodes that followsY 
The excursus is divided into two major units composed in 
quite different styles, connected by a transitional section. The 
first unit is devoted to Athens' acquisition of the position in 
which it was able to grow in power-that is, the hegemony of 
the Ionians and other liberated Greeks. It is introduced and 
concluded by the framing repetition at 89.1 and in the first 
phrase of 96.1. 18 Within this frame Thucydides sets two short 
narratives, the building of the walls despite Spartan opposition 
and the acquisition of the Aegean hegemony. The first is 
framed by the phrases at 89.3, 'tllv 1tOAlV avOtlCODoJ.U:'iv 1tapE-
O'KEUaSOV'to Kat 'to. 'tttXTl, and 93.1, 'tou'tq> 'tip 'tP01tq> Ot 
'A8Tlva'iol 'tllv 1tOAlV hElXTlO'av £V OAlyq>. After the insertion of 
13 Thuc. 1.88: q>of)oullEVOt 'tou~ 'A911vaiov~ 1l1] bttIlE'i1;ov Ovv119oXHV, 6pwnE~ 
ai)'to'i~ 'to. 1to')JJx. 'tii~ • EANlOO~ {mOXElpta f\Ol1 Dna .... 118.2 oi 'A911vaiot TItV 'tE 
apX1]v Eyx:paU(J'tEpav x:a'tE(J'tTt<mv'to x:at au'tot E1tt IlEya Exoopll(mV Ovva-
IlEro~ ... 1tptV 01] i1 Ouvallt~ 'twv 'A911vairov O'aq>ro~ DPE'tO x:at 'tii~ ~vllllaxia~ 
au'twv ll1t'tOv'to. 
14 On Thucydides' practice of introducing excursuses with yap, cf H. P. 
Stahl, "Speeches and Course of Events," in P. A. Stadter, ed., The Speeches in 
Thucydides (Chapel Hill 1973) 60-77 at 70. 
15 Cf Badian, From Piataea 147 (=[1990] 74). 
16 Thuc. 1.97.2: Eypa'Va Oe aU'ta x:at hPOA1]V 'tou A6you E1tOtllO'aIlTlV ]("tA. 
take Ex:f3oATtV to refer to the whole passage 89-117, not just 98-117. 
17 The expression alla Oe x:a\ at 1.97.2 does not introduce an afterthought, 
but an equal or more important reason: cf 1.25.3,92.1; 2.20.4; 5.33.1; 6.89.4 and 
Hornblower Comm. ad loc.: the inadequacy of previous accounts is a "sccond-
order reason" for the excursus. 
18 Thuc. 1.89.1: oi. yap 'A911VatOt 'tp01tcp 'tOtcpOE ~Aeov £1tt 'ta 1tpawa'ta EV 
ot~ llu~Tt911O'av ... 96.1: 1tapaAa/3ov'tE~ Oe oi 'A911va'iOt 'tTtv i1YElloviav 'tou'tcp 'tip 
'tr01tcp· 
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an additional statement on the walls of the Piraeus and Themis-
tocles' advice, which includes several authorial comments,19 the 
framing sentence is repeated in strengthened form at 93.8, 
'A81lva'iot JlEV o-ov ou't(o~ E-tEtxl<J81lcJaV Kat 'taAAa Ka't£<J-
K£ua~ov'to £u8u~ Jl£'ta 't'flv Mft8wv uvaXffiPll<JtV, where 
avaxffipll<JtV refers back to 89.2, btEt8'fl Mft80t aVfxffipll<Jav, 
and to 89.3, E1tEt8'fl au'tO'i~ Ot pappapot EK 'tft~ xffipa~ u1tftA80v. 
The name of Pausanias begins the second story, the transfer of 
hegemony. There is no introductory framing sentence, but the 
frequent repetition of 1lYfI,WVla and its cognates unites the 
episode. A short paragraph (94) lays out the situation as 
Pausanias led the Athenians and the other allies in campaigns to 
Cyprus and Byzantium, EV 'tft8E 'tft llYfl.lOVl~. There follows the 
story of the shift of leadership, as the Ionians and others request 
the Athenians 1lYEJlOva<; <JCprov yiYV£<Jeat (95.1) and the Spartans 
acquiesce, 'tou~ 'AellvalOU~ VOJll~OV't£~ tKavou~ E~rlYf'i<J8at 
(95.7). The episode is summarized in the first clause of 96.1 
(1tapaAaP6v't£~ ... 't'flv llYfJlOVlav ... 8ta 'to fIau<Javlou Jl'i<Jo~). 
The brief transitional section falls between the accounts of the 
acquisition of the hegemony and of the actions of Athens as 
hegemon,20 and describes the establishment and administration 
of the alliance. The Athenians act so as to increase their power, 
with the result that the alliance is transformed into an arche. 
This section begins at 96, then in 97ff overlaps with the account 
of Athenian actions that follows. In fact, one of the first actions 
of the alliance, the repression of Naxos, also provides the model 
for the shift from alliance to arche. The transitional section is 
complete at 99, as is indicated by the framing statement 
regarding the allies' obligations of money and ships at 99.3, 
which echoes that at 96.1,21 and is further marked by the 
authorial statement on the behavior of allies and Athenians at 99. 
Chapter 96 and the first phase of 97 (llYO'\)JlfVOt ... POUAfU-
ov'twv), by laying out the obligations assigned and privileges per-
19 Clear authorial statements at 93.2, 5, 7, but much of the passage seems to 
be personal opinion inserted into the narrative. 
20 For the placement of general observations and personal statements 
between accounts of concrete events, cf Immerwahr (supra n.11) 62. 
21 Thuc. 1.96.1: E'ta~av ae; 'tE EOn 1tapExnV 'trov 1tOAEffiV XPtlJlata 1tpOe; tOY 
~ap~apov Kat &e; vaue;; 99.3: oi. 1tAc\OUe; a\>'trov ... XPtlJlata hu~av'to aV't\ 'trov 
vErov 'to i.1CVOUJlEVOV aVUAffiJla <pEpnv. The existence of this transitional section 
is normally not recognized, but the tie between 96 and 99 is clear, and the 
tone and content are quite different from the list of 98-117. Although 97.1 also 
points toward that list, the remarks on empire are completed at 99. 
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mitted to the allies by the Athenians complete the account of 
acquisition of empire begun in 89-95. The list of Athenian 
actions (98-117) is introduced at 97.1 (1tpaYJ.HXtwV JlE'ta~u 'tOUOE 
'tou 1tOAEJlOU Kat 'tou MTlOlKOU). But the last sentence of 97.2, 
aJla of: Kat 'tft~ apxft~ a1tOOEl~lV £XEl 'tft~ 't<OV 'A8TlvalWV EV Otrp 
'tp01trp Ka'tEO''tTl, refers both back to the acquisition of hegem-
ony in 94f and forward to the forced exaction of tribute de-
scribed in 99. The reduction of Naxos, the fourth item in the list 
of league activities begun at 98.1, furnishes the example that per-
mits Thucydides to round off his account of Athens' behavior 
as hegemon. Chapter 99 completes Thucydides' account of 
Athens' relation to its allies begun in 96: the revolts of Thasos 
and Samos, serious as they are, will merely confirm the 
assessment made at 99.3, aU'tOt oE, 61ton~ a1toO''talEv, a1tapaO'-
KEUOl Kat &1tElPOl £~ 'tOY 1tOAEJ.lOV Ka8icnav'tO. 22 This transitional 
section thus serves multiple functions, looking behind and 
ahead, providing an overview of Athenian imperial policy while 
justifying the whole excursus and its treatment of the period 
between the wars. 
The second major unit is framed by statements at 97.1 and 
118.2, and marked by the renewed statement of purpose for the 
excursus in the second preface at 97.2.23 The prefatory 
statements in 97 introduce a list of some twenty-seven distinct 
episodes of varying length (98-117, see Table I). The fourth 
item, the revolt of Naxos, also serves to round off the transition 
passage on the empire, as I have noted. The individual episodes 
are set off by chronological markers (especially f.1E'ta 'tau'ta, 
UO''tEpOV)24 and by names that introduce new subjects (lnarus 
the Libyan, 104.1; Orestes of Thessaly, 111.1). The list style 
22 Herodotus faced a similar structural problem in recounting the revolt of 
the Magi. Normally the accession of one king followed smoothly on the 
death of another, but in this case the false Smerdis gains power while 
Cambyses is still alive (3.61), so that the two reigns overlap. Herodotus 
preserves this overlap in his narrative. 
23 Thuc. 1.97.1: 'tocraD£ btT1A8ov 1tOAt~cp 't£ "Kat DWXEtptcrEt 1tpay~a'twv 
~£'tasu 'tou 1toAi~ou "Kat 'tou MT]Dt"KOU, a i:yEvno 1tp6~ 't£ 'tOY ~apl3apov au'to'i~ 
"Kat 1tpO~ 'tou~ crCjl£'tEPOU~ SU~JlaxOU~ v£w't£ptt;ovm~ "Kat nfAo1tOVVT]O"tWV 'tou~ 
aid 1tpo<Huyxavov'ta~ £V £"Kacr'tcp; 118.2: 'tau'ta D£ s,u~1tav'ta ocra £1tpas,av oi 
"EAAT]V£~ 1tp6~ 't£ aAAT]AoU~ "Kat 'tOY ~ap~apov £yivno £V £-tfat 1t£v'tT]KoV'ta 
~aAt(na ~£'tasu 'ti1~ 't£ :::tpsou avaxwpT]O£W~ Kat 'ti1~ apxi1~ 'touD£ 'tou 1tOAt-
~ou. There is an echo of 1.18.3. The final words of 1.97, are echoed at 1.118.2, 
£v ot~ oi 'A8T]va'iOt 'tT]V 't£ apXl)v £YKpan:<Htpav Ka't£01:T]Oav'to. 
~ A full list in Comme, !leT I 361. 
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employed here is archaic, with little attempt to tie together 
events causally or otherwise. 25 As we shall see, the section 
records the Athenian actions that demonstrated her power and 
its growth down to the Samian revolt. 
II. The Foundations of the Athenian Challenge 
to Spartan Hegemony 
P. K. Walker succinctly presented the pivotal role the Pente-
contaetia plays in the exposition of the causes of the war sig-
naled at 23.5f.26 The excursus is the principal passage to address 
the aATl8Eo"C(hTl 7tPOq>aOl<;, although many others, especially the 
debate at Sparta, contribute to the reader's understanding. The 
context of the excursus, coming immediately after the decision 
at Sparta that Athens had broken the treaty, determines that the 
relationship of Athens and Sparta will be a major theme. The 
contrast between Sparta and Athens is ever present in the 
Pentecontaetia as in Book I as a whole. 27 Sparta before and still 
at the end of the Persian War was the leader of Greece, the 
natural hegemon of the Hellenic League, the unchallenged 
commander at Salamis and Plataea. 28 By 432 the Spartans were 
put in the position of declaring war against Athens to stop its 
relentless growth and interference with Spartan allies. The ques-
tion posed by Thucydides after the decision at Sparta is not 
"how was Sparta bad and Athens good?" or even "who was 
responsible for the war?" but "how did Sparta lose its previous 
absolute hegemony and Athens rise to a position where it could 
challenge the former leader?" Thucydides presents this situ-
ation as the result of Sparta's reluctance and inadequacy in 
25 Cf Walker 34. For examples of the archaic use of lists, cf H. Frankel, 
Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy (Oxford 1975) 517, index item 3.1 ff. On 
the power and flexibility of lists and their 'para tactic style', cf Immerwahr 
(supra n.11) 26ff, 47-51. Note the frequency of Kui as a connective in 105-17. 
Occasional causal statements occur: cf n.75 infra. 
26 Walker, esp. 27-33; cf Westlake 59. 
27 Cf H. R. Rawlings, The Structure of Thucydides' History (Princeton 
1981) 91. The contrast is seen by Thucydides in terms of political behavior, 
not of morality, as Badian has argued, From Piataea 130, 132-35 (=[1990] 52, 
55ff), stressing the supposed "innocence" of the Athenians and "deviousness," 
"hypocrisy," and "treachery" of the Spartans. 
28 Cf Thuc. 1.18.2: o'i 'tE AUK£{)atJlOVWt 'troY ~\JJl7tOMJl1lcrclV'trov 'EAATtvrov 
lJY1lcruv'to O\JVclJlEt 7tpoUXOV'tE<;. 
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addressing changing circumstances and of Athens' extraor-
dinary dynamism and audacity, the very factors remarked by 
the Corinthians in their speech to the Spartans (1.69). 
As so often in archaic and classical texts, the account has been 
postponed until the most effective point.29 Only at the moment 
of the Spartan decision does Thucydides pause to sketch the 
previous course of events that led them to their vote. 
Athenian determination and ingenuity lay the groundwork for 
their arche, revealed in Thucydides' narrative by four discrete 
items placed at the beginning of the Pentecontaetia: the siege of 
Sestos, the rebuilding of the city walls, the fortification of the 
Peiraeus, and the assumption of the hegemony of the Ionians 
(1.89.2-95). All these actions are in contrast with or opposition 
to those of Sparta, the established hegemon and leader of the 
league against Persia. The Spartans withdrew from the war 
against Persia (89.2, 95.7). They discouraged the rebuilding of 
the Athenian city wall and wanted to supply commanders for 
the fleet operating in the Aegean, but were unwilling to take 
firm action to achieve either goal (92, 95.7). Because neither 
Sparta nor Athens desired an open break, both sides hid the 
power struggle behind fair words,30 although Themistocles 
insisted frankly, once the height of the walls permitted, on 
Athenian equality. 
Thucydides' mode of telling the story-with numerous in-
direct speeches, a dialogue, reports of thoughts, and use of the 
historical present31-reveals Spartan assumptions and percep-
29 Noted by E. Fraenkel, Aeschylus, Agamemnon (Oxford 1950) I 39, III 
805 (App. A) for details within a narrative. Although Fraenkel in the title of 
the appendix seems to limit this feature to archaic narrative, and apart from 
Aesch. Ag. 59 and 190 cites only Hdt. 1.110-12, it is also classical, found, e.g., 
in Xenophon's self-introduction, delayed until Anab. 3.1.4. In Thucydides, 
compare the late introduction of Pericles as a major protagonist at 1.127. The 
technique often conveys the surprise of the participants, as at 1.50.5, 2.5.1, or 
6.46. 
30 Cf 90.2: aU OTJAoUV'tE~; 91.3: Kpucpa, ~KlO"'ta btl<pavw~, O"a<pw~ uKouO"ElaV; 
91.4: <pavEpw~ dVfll; 92.1: 0PrTlV <paVEpaV OUK btOlOUV'tO, UOtlAo)~ ilx8ov'tO. The 
deception is not all on one side, as Badian suggests (From Plataea 130 [=(1990) 
52]): this is polite diplomacy covering power politics. 
31 Indirect speeches: 90.2 (Spartans), 3 (Athenians, Themistocles); 91.1 
(travellers from Athens), 2 (Themistocles), 3 (Themistocles, by letter or 
messenger), 4-7 (Themistocles), 7 (Themistocles); 95.1 (Ionians and others); 
indirect dialogue: 90.5 (Themistocles and a Spartan); thoughts: 90.1, 2 
(Spartans), 2, 3 (Themistocles); 92.1 (Spartans); 93.3, 6, 7 (Themistocles); 95.1 
(allies), 2 (Athenians), 7 (Spartans); historical presents: 91.2f (KEAEUEl, 
U7tOO"'t£AAoUO"lV, 7t£Il7tEl), 95.5f (U7tOAUnfll, EK7t£Il7tOUO"lv). 
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tions and brings to the fore Athens' delicate position at this 
time, neither daring to oppose Sparta and her allies openly, nor 
accepting a subordinate position. Diplomacy and rapid action 
were the only answer. The complex interplay of spoken and 
unspoken attitudes and presuppositions in Thucydides' narra-
tive of these first moments of the postwar period lays the 
foundation for all that will follow. Sparta wanted Athens 
relatively weak and under her protection. 32 Athens wished to 
decide for itself: "send to us as to people who can decide what 
is advantageous for themselves and for the common good" 
(91.4), but it was only able to do so if it based its freedom to 
speak out on "a balance of strength" (91.7).33 The Athenians, led 
by Themistocles, recognized that they could never be 
independent and strong unless they were able to defy Spartan 
threats: their walls gave them the means to do this. G. de Ste. 
Croix rightly observes that Athens had every reason to be 
distrustful of offers of Spartan support in 478, considering the 
history of the previous years. 34 They must turn instead to their 
own efforts. When the Athenians returned to their city, "most 
of the buildings had been ruined, and only a few survived" 
(89.3). The city was defenceless; fortifications were necessary 
for independence. 35 Building the walls required tremendous 
sacrifice of the Athenians: "everyone in the city, the whole 
population, were to build the wall, sparing neither public nor 
private buldings from which any use might be made, but tearing 
them all down. "36 The narrative invites the reader to imagine the 
pain and the ambition of the Athenians as they tore down what 
was left of tombs, homes and temples to fortify their ruined 
city. Themistocles' speech to the Spartans at 91.4-7 captures the 
pride and determination of the Athenians; Thucydides' 
32 Cf. 90.2 and the similar Peloponnesian suggestion that the Ionians 
migrate to mainland Greece to avoid Persian domination (Hdt. 9.106.2f). 
33 The importance of equality of power for equality of speech in interna-
tional relations is a fundamental Thucydidean theme: cf e.g. 1.73.1, 77.2ff; 
3.9.2, 11.2; 5.89. 
34 Cf. the summary in G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, Origins of the Pelopormesian 
War (London 1972) 167ff, who however glosses over Spartan reluctance to 
fight against the Persians outside the Peloponnese. 
35 For walls as a major theme of Thucydides, see Y. Garlan, "Fortifications 
et histoire grecque," in J.-P. Vernant, ed., ProbLemes de La guerre en Grece 
ancienne (Paris 1968) 245-60 at 255f; McNeal 312. 
36 Thuc. 1.90.3. Cf also 93.2. 
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authorial comment giving the evidence for the frantic speed of 
the work (93.2) emphasizes the impressiveness of the 
achievement. 
New walls permitted Athens to stand up to the Spartans 
immediately after the Persian Wars; the fortification of Peiraeus 
laid the groundwork for their future empire. Thucydides 
therefore describes next the construction of the Peiraeus walls, 
not supplying a precise date, but placing it as well soon after the 
retreat of the PersiansY Mixing historical report and authorial 
interpretation, he presents Themistocles as the founder of the 
arche: "he persuaded them also to build the rest of the Peiraeus 
wall ... since he thought that ... if they would become seamen it 
would conduce significantly toward their acquiring power 
(ouva~lt(;)-he was the first one who dared to say that they 
must embrace the sea-straightway with this he laid the basis 
for the empire ('tT)v apxf)v)" (93.3). Here we find for the first 
time at Athens the combination of walls and navy that were the 
twin cornerstones of Thucydides' analysis of imperial power. 38 
Again, as at 93.2, details of the construction of the walls rein-
force the account. In both cases the circumstantial account of 
construction serves as a rhetorical auxesis of the achievement. 
Once more Thucydides enters the mind of Themistocles to 
explain his strategic objectives (93.6f, E~OUAf'tO ... Ev6~lt~fV .. , 
'ta~ yap yaUCH ,HXAta'ta npocrflCfl'tO, ioffiv ... Ev6Ill~f), which are 
those that Pericles will follow in the war against Sparta: defend 
the city from the walls, but put all possible manpower in the 
fleet and resist all comers on the sea.39 The whole passage, from 
89.3 to 93.8, directs our attention in unmistakable terms to the 
strengths on which Athens will base its determination to be 
second to no one: walls that will protect it from attack on land, 
and a navy that can both defend and attack, as it had against the 
Persians. It was to the Spartans' advantage to thwart that inde-
pendence by hindering the construction of the walls; Themis-
tocles' cleverness and the Athenians' incredible energy had 
37 Thuc. 1.93.8: EUSUe; JlE'tU 'tl)V M1\Swv avaxwpT)OW. 
38 The theoretical analysis is presented in the Archaeology, 1.2-19. C[ also 
1.93.6f and the statements of Pericles' policy 1.143.3, 2.13.7, and J de Romilly, 
Histoire et raison chez Thucydide (Paris 1956) 260-73. 
39 C[ esp. Thuc. 1.43.3ff, and see G. L. Cawkwell, "Thucydides' Judgement 
of Periclean Strategy," YCS 34 (1975) 53-70; A J. Holladay, "Athenian 
Strategy in the Archidamian War," Historia 27 (1978) 399-427. 
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circumvented them, and they had to accept the result with the 
best grace they could manage. 
Throughout this narrative the Athenians consciously con-
structed their own power base against the veiled opposition of 
the Spartans. Once these initial steps had been taken, they 
moved at once to extend their dominion at the expense of the 
Spartans. Pausanias' harsh behavior as general gave the opening, 
but Thucydides tells us that the Athenians seized the opportun-
ity with open eyes for their own profit. When the Ionian 
envoys asked them to become their leader and to protect them 
from Pausanias, he writes, "the Athenians accepted their argu-
ments and determined that they would not ignore [the Ionians' 
plight] and that they would arrange matters as it seemed most 
advantageous for themselves. "40 Avenging the Ionians by rav-
aging the king's land was a pretext (7tpocrXTlJ.la, 96.1);41 the aim of 
helping the Ionians was to further their own interests, depriving 
the Spartans of hegemony in the Aegean and establishing their 
own arche. The very speed and confidence with which the 
Athenians assumed their new role-already rehearsed in the 
campaign against Sestos (89.2)- revealed their goals. 
Why did Sparta not immediately block Athens' hegemonic 
ambitions? The Spartans, according to Thucydides' narrative, 
wanted to preserve their hegemony in the Aegean as in the rest 
of Greece,42 but a prompt and firm response was inhibited by 
other considerations. Thucydides' rather full report of the recall 
and hearing of the allied accusations against Pausanias conveys 
the Spartan reluctance to act against a leading Spartiate despite 
the indignation and charges of their allies. This reluctance could 
40 Thuc. 1.95.2: 7tPOOElXOV 't~v YVWf,lllv ro~ ou 7tl:PW\jIOf,lEVOt 't(U,An 'tE x:o'to-
o'tllOOf,lEVOt n q>o'ivOt'to apto'to oU'to'i~, Cf also 93.3f, 96.1. For apto'to as 
'advantageous', cf 6.8.2,26.1. This seems to me in full agreement with the view 
of Herodotus 8.3.2: "they took Pausanias' arrogance as an excuse (prophasis) 
and took the hegemony away from the Spartans." The view of «Athens' 
foundation of the Oelian league as an innocent matter" (P. ]. Rhodes, CAH2 
V 47) is distinctly un-Thucydidean. 
41 For the meaning of 7tPOOXllf,lO see Rawlings and Hornblower, Comm. ad 
loco Thucydides expresses the same attitude toward the causes of the Sicilian 
expedition, an attempt to establish another arche, 6.6.1. 
42 The dispatch of Oorcis and the others to the fleet indicates the Spartans' 
desire to continue as leaders. 
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only confirm allied leanings toward Athens. 43 Thucydides is 
silent on the discussions at Sparta that must have followed the 
allied defection, but does indicate some motives for their 
acquiescence in the loss of their hegemony. Pausanias, their 
most forceful commander, no longer seemed trustworthy de-
spite his acquittal. His successor Dorcis was rejected by the 
Greeks. The Spartans did not send others, for fear that duty 
abroad would corrupt them, as it had Pausanias; and in any case 
they wished to be free of the Persian war. Finally, they did not 
believe that Athens was a direct threat to their power. As in the 
case of the walls, where Thucydides remarks that the Spartans 
still were friendly to the Athenians at this time (92.1, 1tpocrqaAEl<; 
QV'tE<; EV 'tip 't6'tE), they thought that the Athenians would be 
useful to themselves for the present (95.7, (J(piotv EV 'tip t6tE 
1tap6v'tt E1tltTl8dou<;). Thucydides implies a note of conde-
scension: they considered the Athenians lxavou<; E~TlYElcr8al. 
They would discover the truth soon enough. At the same time, 
Thucydides emphasizes that this was the Spartan attitude "for 
the present"; if the situation were to change, they reserved the 
right to reevaluate their decision. 44 
The narrative in these chapters is focused on the power bal-
ance between Athens and Sparta at the end of the Persian War. 
The Athenians' incredible success in rising out of the ashes and 
laying a basis for their future strength invited elaborate treat-
ment, with frequent indirect quotations and reports of the 
thought of the actors, as well as authorial observations on the 
significance on what was done. In the remaining narrative, both 
Spartan strength and Athenian ambitions were givens: the 
explicandum was the growth of Athenian power, seen in 
43 Consider different possible scenarios. When complaints are heard against 
Pausanias, the Spartans immediately (a) recall him and send out a new and 
more gracious commander with a fleet of respectable size to support him; or 
(b) send Pausanias more ships and men to enforce his will, simultaneously 
warning the Athenians that any disloyalty will mean an immediate invasion. 
Under such conditions the transfer of hegemony might never have taken 
place. Diodorus (11.50) reports sentiment at Sparta to recover the hegemony, 
by force if necessary, but the notion was soon abandoned. On Spartan 
reluctance to deal forcefully with Pausanias, cf. also Thuc. 1.128-35. 
44 The silence on internal debate in both cities is striking, but of a piece with 
the rest of the excursus, which does not treat divisions within either Sparta or 
Athens. See below, section 7. The relation of the whole passage in style and 
content to 1.126-38 must be reserved for another occasion. 
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relation to Sparta. 45 For this reason the focus of the following 
narrative is on Athens' actions, not intentions, and Sparta 
appears only in so far as its actions affect or illuminate those of 
Athens. Only occasional and generally unfulfilled efforts chal-
lenged the growth of Athenian power, as when Thasos and 
Euboea revolted. Even the great battle of Tanagra, according to 
Thucydides' narrative, was unintended, forced by Athenian 
domination of the Megarid and the Corinthian Gulf. The most 
significant Peloponnesian effort to block Athenian initiatives 
was the Corinthian invasion of the Megarid, aimed at breaking 
the siege of Aegina, which ended in disaster, and the invasion of 
446, which supported Megara's revolt. Whether from indepen-
dence, fear, or the greed of individual Spartans, the Spartans did 
not accept Megabazus' inducements to invade Attica while the 
Athenians were committed in Egypt,46 nor later did they help 
Sam os when it revolted. 47 Athens' defeats, even when signi-
ficant, as with the Egyptian disaster and the losses of Boeotia 
and Megara, still do not prevent its exercise of overwhelming 
force at Samos. In Thucydides' narrative the Pentecontaetia is 
dominated by a strong, aggressive, and ceaselessly active 
Athens. 
45 Athens' power vis-a-vis Persia is not a major concern in the Pentecon-
taetia. The victory of the Eurymedon, the defeat in Egypt, and the other 
actions implied by 97.1 (1tpO<; 'tOy IW-p~pov) and 118.2 ('tov ~ap~(lpov ) are pre-
sented in the context of Athens' ability to assert itself against Sparta. This 
focus on Spartan-Athenian rivalry explains why 1.1S.3, a summary statement, 
is silent on the fighting against Persia. Does this indicate that the Pentecon-
taetia was composed before 411, or at least before 40S? The role of Persia 
deserves more attention in the composition debate, but cf. Andrewes, 
"Thucydides and the Persians," Historia 10 (1961) 1-18 
46 Thucydides' report on Megabazus' mission to Sparta is cryptic, but may 
refer to Spartans taking the money without effecting any change in rolicy. We 
can only guess. Cf D. M. Lewis, Sparta and Persia (Leiden 1977) 33 , 62 n.S4. 
47 Thucydides tells elsewhere that a vote was taken on the matter by the 
Peloponnesians, 1.40.5, 41.2, 43.1. If indeed the Peloponnesian League fol-
lowed the bicameral model of A. H. M. Jones, "Two Synods of the Delian 
and Peloponnesian League," PCPS N5. 2 (1952-53) 43--46, supported by de Ste. 
Croix (supra n.34) 200-03, then Sparta had already decided to act at this time, 
but was dissuaded by its allies. In any case, as with Thasos, nothing was 
done. 
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III. The Exercise of Hegemony 
Chapters 96-99 present an overall view of the Athenian arche 
in two segments, the initial dispositions (96) and how they 
changed (97ff). The latter segment begins and ends with au-
thorial comments on the meaning of the change. In 96 Thucyd-
ides describes how the Athenians as hegemon established their 
relations to the allies. They assigned48 the allies quotas of ships 
and money; the Hellenotamiai were established as an Athenian 
magistracy, which would supervise the collection of tribute;49 
and Delos, an island under Athenian protection if not control, 
was established as the treasury and meeting place. 50 Thucydides 
does not here describe a league in which Athens was an equal 
member, but a hegemony in which Athens offered protection 
and reprisals against Persian territory, and the allies supported 
Athens with ships and money. 51 He states the sum of the first 
phoros;52 but unlike other authors, he is silent on the actual 
swearing of oaths and the role of Aristides in winning over the 
allies and setting the tribute quotas. 53 
48 Thuc. 1.96.1 E-taSav. the standard word for assignment of tribute, and the 
term used after the subjugation of Thasos (101.3), Aegina (108.5), and Samos 
(117.3). 
49 Note the emphatic repetition <popov ... <papa ... <p6po<; (96.2). In exacting trib-
ute, the Athenians were following the lead of Croesus and the Persians (as 
Herodotus points out, 1.6.2; 6.43; 7.51), not that of the Spartans. 
50 Delos was sacred to all the Ionians (and to Dorians as well), but it was 
hardly neutral territory. Already in the sixth century Pisistratus had asserted 
Athenian control over Delos when he purified it (Hdt. 1.64.2, cf Thuc. 3.104). 
Delian temple accounts of 434-432 were dated by Athenian and Delian 
magistrates, and preserved in Athens: ML 62. In winter 426/425 the Athenians 
purified Delos and reestablished the Delian festival (on which see Horn-
blower, Comm. ad 3.104). Note that at 1.96.2, 'tajltE'iov 'tE dT1Ao<; ~v au'to'i<; • 
.. au'to'i<;" refers to the Athenians, not the allies. Thucydides does not speak of 
the transfer of the treasury to Athens, presumably because he did not think it 
a significant event in the history of Athenian power. 
51 The question of the constitution of the alliance and the functioning of its 
synod is too complex to treat here. Besides the passage, see Thuc. 3.9-14, esp. 
10.5 and 11.3, and Meiggs (supra n.3) 42-49, 459--64; M. Ostwald, Autonomia: 
Its Genesis and Early History (Chico 1982); and P. Culham, "The Delian 
League: Bicameral or Unicameral?" AJAH 3 (1978) 27-31, with references to 
earlier discussions. 
52 The figure serves both to indicate the size of the income Athens had 
gained, and to contrast with the sums that would later be reached (600 talents 
in 432, according to 2.13.3, which some try to emend). 
53 Cf Diad. 11.47; Arist. Ath. PoL 23; Pluto Arist. 22-25. 
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There follows a summary of the change over time in this 
arrangement: the allies were originally ('to 1tpilrtov) autonomous 
under the leadership of Athens and gave advice in the common 
assemblies, but thereafter the Athenians came to their position 
of strength ('tocra8E E1tTlA80v)54 through warfare and the manage-
ment of affairs dealing with the barbarians, their own revolting 
allies, and with the Peloponnesians. 55 A second authorial com-
ment functions, as mentioned above, as a "second preface," ex-
plaining the need for the present excursus on the fifty years. 
Three quick notices reporting decisive actions against other 
cities-the enslavement of Eion and Scyros, the defeat of 
Carystus (Persians, other non-Greeks, and Greek medizers)-
lead to the Athenian reduction of an ally, Naxos, which had 
tried to renege on its obligations by seceding (a1tocr'tacrl) from 
the Athenian hegemony. This use of force against an ally, the 
first overt indication of the reality of Athenian leadership, pro-
vokes Thucydides to comment; and he does not honey the 
cup. His words, "this was the first allied city to be enslaved, 
contrary to what was established" (1tpoo't1'\ 'tE a:u't1'\ 1tOAU:; ~UIl­
llaXtC; 1tapa 'to Ka8Ecr't1'\KOC; E80UA0081'\, 98.4), are a forceful, 
vivid expression of self-interested power. 56 The enslavement of 
Naxos was not unique, but as the first was a powerful paradigm, 
54 I take btilA.8ov not in the unique sense offered by the scholiast, Betant, 
and LS] of 'accomplish' (perficere, OlE1tpa~uV'to), but in the usual sense of 
'come/go to'. For the use of 'toaaoE as "such great resources/strength" cf 
1.144.4.4, Oill( ano 'tOlVOE OpJlOlJlEVOl, and for the sense of the phrase, 1.118.2, 
Ent JlEYU EXOlPTjOUV OUVaJlEco<;. The standard interpretation, "accomplish so 
many deeds," which I think less accurate, does convey the notion of the list of 
deeds, picked up first in npaYJlum, then in the list-narrative of 98-117. The 
ambiguity reinforces the equation deeds=power. If my interpretation is 
preferred, then the position arrived at would be that of 432 B.C. 
55 Cf the reference to the growth in paraskeue of both Athens and Sparta at 
1.18.3. 
5(, Cf Gomme, HCT I 282, arguing against the notion of the Pentecontaetia 
as an apologia for the Athenian empire, an idea recently revived by Badian, 
From P/ataea 125-62: "the apologia is rather heavily veiled by sentences such 
as nupa 'to lCu8EO'tTjlCO<; EoouM08Tj." The precise sense of lCu8EO'tTjlCO<; here is 
not clear: is it established Greek custom, or the particular oaths sworn by the 
allies and Athens? Ostwald (supra n.51: 39) glosses the phrase as "unpre-
cedented." In either case, Thucydides is using strong and negative words to 
describe Athens' exercise of its power over the allies. Cf also the speeches of 
Hermocrates and Euphemus at Camarina, 7.77.1, 82.3-83.2. 
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like the Corcyraean stasis. 57 Athens had the strength and the 
will to force cities to submit, and rigidly insisted on full com-
pliance with their obligations (99). In bringing pressure to bear, 
they were no longer £v ft80vn but AU1tTlPoL58 The contrast 
between the allies and the Athenians, which allows Thucydides 
to call the former atHOL is that these lacked the will to fight and 
endure pain so apparent on the part of the Athenians-"they 
were neither accustomed to nor desirous of hard work." The 
very act of withdrawing from the fleet (for those who initially 
contributed ships) increased the Athenians' power and their 
predominance on campaign. The text does not argue that the 
Athenians enslaved their allies "without malice afore-
though t"59 but that the allies abetted the Athenian drive for 
power and dominion by shunning their obligations, as earlier 
the behavior of the Spartans had made the transfer of hegem-
ony possible. Whether the superiority achieved by the Athe-
nians during the Persian Wars was already sufficient to over-
whelm the united resistance of the allied cites we cannot say, 
but Thucydides believed that allied reluctance to make an effort 
was a major factor in the growth of Athenian strength. 60 The 
hypothesis is not unreasonable, for without the flow of money 
from the allies, Athens could not have maintained the prepon-
derance of its navy.61 This is the last that Thucydides will say on 
the subject of the administration of the empire per se until 
1.118.2. According to his presentation, the Athenians saw the 
hegemony as a way to augment their own strength through the 
57 Cf 3.82.1, EV 'to'i~ 1tpOnT]. Corycra presumably was not absolutely first, but 
the earliest example that provided a suitable paradigm. 
58 To be obnoxious was the price of empire: cf the Athenians' words at 
Sparta (1.76.1) and Pericles' in his last speech (2.64.5). 
59 Badian, From Plataea 132 (=[1990] 55). 
60 The major cities of the Delian League-Chios, Lesbos, Samos-undoubt-
edly found an advantage in helping Athens suppress minor cities, until they 
discovered (in 440-439, if not before) that Athens had become too strong for 
them to maintain their former independence. Ionian servility and avoidance 
of toil is also a Herodotean theme: see esp. 6.11£. 
61 Pace Badian, From Plataea 133f (=[1990] 56£), who wrongly, it seems to 
me, emphasizes the allies' neglect of military competence. The point is rather 
that by paying money and not serving on their own ships, the allies both 
strengthened Athens and weakened themselves. If, e.g., the ratio of Athenian 
to allied ships was 3:1, and the allied phoros paid for 1/3 of the Athenian 
ships, spending this money on their own ships and crews would have 
rendered the allied fleet equal to that of Athens. 
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addition of allied money and ships; the allied tendency to avoid 
naval service and to substitute money payments meant a steady 
increase in Athenian power and a corresponding lessening of 
allied independence and influence on the actions of the 
Athenians.62 
IV. Major Episodes of Chapters 98-117 
The "long catalogue of military enterprises" at 100-17,63 with 
the prior events of 98, records a series of actions by the Athe-
nians (with or without allies) in the period from the siege of 
Eion to the defeat of Samos. The Peloponnesians appear only in 
so far as they provoke or respond to Athenian action. Some 
episodes are treated rather fully: ThasoslIthome (100.2-103.3); 
the siege of Aegina and the Corinthian attempts to end it 
(105.2-106.2); the Egyptian campaign (104.1£; 109f); the Doris-
Tanagra campaign (107.2-108.2); and the Samian War (115.2-1-
17). 
R. A. McNeal some time ago put forward an analysis of this 
section that revealed some of the relations between the various 
episodes. 64 Although his theory that Thucydides alternated in a 
regular pattern the three categories of actions mentioned in 1.97 
(against barbarians, allies, and Pcloponnesians) seems to distort 
the analysis and to divide such items as the Samian War, which 
are better taken as units,65 his observation of ring composi tion 
in the central passage, the series of incidents framed by the 
Egyptian campaign (104-10), seems valid, supported by corres-
ponding pairs of topics and verbal echoes. (,(, 
62 Cf the implication of loss of autonomy and role in policy-making at 
1.97.1, and the statement at 1.99.2 that the allies no longer campaigned on an 
equal footing. The Pentecontaetia records fourteen actions by the Athenians 
alone, eight in which the allies took part, but Thucydides may not chose to 
state explicitly all such occasions. 
63 Cf J. de Romilly, Thucydide e l'imperialisme athenien (Paris 1947) 79. 
H McNeal, esp. 312-18. His ideas have been further developed by T. E. 
Wick, "The Compositional Structure of Chapters 98-117 of Thucydides' 
Excursus on the Pentacontaetia (1.89ff.)," AntCl51 (1982) 15-24. 
65 The analysis of the Samian campaigns (15H) seems especially artificial, as 
McNeal acknowledges. 
66 For other evidence of ring composition in Thucydides, see Hammond, 
Katicic (supra n.ll), and W. R. Connor, Thucydide5 (Princeton 1984) index 
5.7). 
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a 104: Egypt: initial Greek success (104.1, 'Ivapox; oE 0 
qJal1I1TrttXOU, A i~uS, ~a(JtArUS A t~u(J)v .... ) 
b 105.1: landing at Halieis, sea battle at Cecryphaleia 
c 105.2: siege of Aegina 
(105.3-106: Corinthian defeats in the Megarid) 
d 107.1: long walls begun 
e 107.2-108.2: Tanagra campaign: Athenian defeat 
e1 108.2--4: Oenophyta campaign: Athenian victory 
d l 108.4: long walls completed 
c1 108.4: Aegina surrenders 
bl 108.5: landings at Gytheion and Corinthian Chalcis 
at 109-110: Egypt: Greek defeat ('Ivapox; oE 0 A t~u(J)v 
~acrtAeUS) 
The construction of the whole unit reinforces the chronologi-
cal overlap of the Egyptian campaign and the other concurrent 
events, especially the naval battle and siege of Aegina and the 
battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta that led to the conquest of 
Aegina and control of Boeotia. The Corinthian expeditions are 
structurally subordinate to the siege of Aegina, which they en-
deavor to relieve, although the drama and pathos involved give 
them unusual prominence. 
Two other major units come near the beginning and at the 
end of this second part. In the hrst unit, the interweaving of the 
revolts of Thasos and of the helots on Ithome dramatically 
illustrates Athenian dynamism by contrast with Spartan leth-
argy. When a disgreement with the Thasians arose,67 Athens 
dispatched a naval force, defeated the Thasians in a sea battle and 
landed troops; they sent out 10,000 colonists to Ennea Hodoi,68 
67 Thucydides' tantalizingly brief notice on the precedents of the conflict 
has aroused much criticism. Two features may be remarked: his reference to 
the emporia and mines of the Thasian-controlled mainland implies that 
Athens was trying to exercise some control in the area, presumably for its own 
profit, and the very vagueness of the cause makes more vivid the rapidity and 
force of the Athenian action. 
68 That all these colonists were later lost at Drabescus indicates the pathos 
associated with such dynamic imperialism, whatever the date of the disaster, 
which I take to be sometime after the fall of Thasos. Cf Thuc. 4.102.2, with 
Hornblower, Comm. 155; Badian, From Piataea 81-86, 103 (expanded from 
[1988] 298ff, 320), who argues that it must be sometime after the settlement of 
the colony, and in particular in 453/452. 
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which they captured from the Edonoi; and they besieged 
Thasos, which fell after two years. The Thasians had to remove 
their walls, surrender their ships, repay the cost of the war, and 
become subject to tribute. The Spartans, on the other hand, 
although initially determined to act in their own imperial 
interests and against Athens, when the helots and some peri-
oikoi revolted and fortified themselves on Mt Ithome, not only 
were forced to abandon their plan of invading Attica in support 
of the Thasians,69 but had to ask for help from their allies, 
including the Athenians. It took the Spartans nine years to force 
the helots to abandon their stronghold, even with the help of 
their allies/o and afterwards Athens was able to establish these 
helots, thereafter known as Messenians, at Naupactus, creating a 
permanent thorn in Sparta's side. 71 Thus the Thasian revolt pro-
vided an opportunity for Athens to strengthen her position 
relative to her allies; the Messenian revolt, on the other hand, 
both hindered Sparta from its objectives and strengthened the 
Athenian position. In addition, according to Thucydides, Spar-
tan suspicion at !thorne alienated Athens and brought into the 
open their previously concealed differences. 72 Athens aban-
doned the Spartan alliance and formed new alliances wi th 
Argos, Sparta's tradi tional enemy, and with Thessaly. The inter-
locking narrative thus provides an example of Athens' initiative 
and success in turning a dangerous revolt to its advantage and of 
Sparta's inability to control events.?3 The qualities that the 
69 This notice is often doubted, but the point here is that Thucydides 
presents the Spartan desire to help Thasos in a way consistent with the rest of 
the Pentecontaetia. 
70 It is not justifiable to emend on:6:tcp at 103.1. Lj. among others D. W. 
Reece, "The Date of the Fall of Ithome," JHS 82 (1962) 111-20; McNeal; and 
Badian, From Piataea 79ff, 102 (expanded from [1988] 297f, 318). 
71 Perhaps the action of Tolmides in 456: cf Lewis, CAlF V 110, 117f. 
72 Thuc. 1.102.3: KUt otu<popa EK tuvtT)~ tT\~ (jtputdu~ 7tponov AUKE-
outJ.l.oviot~ KUt 'AeT)vuiOt~ <pUVEpO: EytvoVto. Contrast the various references to 
secrecy on both sides in 90-95, and the secret Spartan promise to Thasos at 
101.1. 
73 They also serve as a model for treatment of revolts or attempted secession 
from an hegemony, a frequent subject in the Pentecontaetia. Athens, 
according to Thucydides, reduces Naxos, Thasos, Euboea, Samos, and 
Byzantium (others are omitted) but loses Megara in 446; Sparta reduces 
Ithome, recovers Megara only many years after it left the alliance, and never 
regains the Aegean Greeks. Egypt revolted but was recovered by Persia. 
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Spartans feared at Ithome, 'to 'tOA.J,lT1POv Kat VEOO'tEp01totiav of 
the Athenians, are manifest in the following narrative. 
The Pentecontaetia ends with the war against Samos, which 
Hornblower describes as "exceptionally and surprisingly fu11."74 
It is indeed longer than most episodes but not exceptionally 







the complaint of Miletus (11S.2f5 
the Athenian expedition and its effect (115.3) 
the counterrevolution, including the loss of the 
Athenian garrisons and the revolt of Byzantium 
(llS.4£) 
(a) second Athenian expedition and the sea battle 
(116.1) 
(b) Athenian reinforcements to Samos (116.2) 
(c) Pericles' expedition against Phoenician fleet 
(116.3) 
Samian breakout and naval victory and the 
result (117.1) 
Pericles' return, new reinforcements, the third 
sea battle, siege and capture of Samos, and 
surrender terms (117.2£). 
The account is long because the Samians refused to accept de-
feat and their constant renewal of the conflict forced the 
Athenians to bring to bear an ever-increasing armada against 
them, not because Thucydides expands his narrative with orna-
men tal detail. He describes in turn the three stages of Samian 
opposition, each countered by a greater Athenian force. The 
Sam ian victory in stage 5 gave them a brief period to bring in 
supplies-exactly fourteen days, Thucydides notes-before the 
Athenians were able to blockade them once more. When 
Athenian and allied strength hnall y reaches 215 ships, the 
Samians are disposed of in a sentence: "The Samians attempted a 
short naval battle, but being unable to resist, were conquered 
by siege in nine months and surrendered on the condition that 
they would destroy their wall, give hostages, surrender their 
ships, and repay the cost of the war in installments" (1.117.3). 
74 Hornblower, Comm. 187 ad 1.115.2-117. 
75 Short causal statements are occasionally found, even in the Pentecon-
taetia: cf. 100.2,102.1,104.1,113.1, and the longer narrative at 107.2ff. 
STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, 
Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 
56 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONT AETIA 
Byzantium surrendered as well, and returned to itS subject 
status. 
Although long by the standards of chapters 98-114, the fifty-
two lines devoted to the war are less than half of Plutarch's one 
hundred nineteen (Per. 25-28). Thucydides offers no account 
of the Samian government, the nature of the stasis, Pissouthnes' 
intervention (clearly of major importance), the Phoenician 
threat, the debates at Athens and in the Peloponnesian League, 
or the siege. The focus is on Athens' firm response to each 
threat and the numbers of ships employed. The narrative 
provides evidence for Athens' strength and its willingness to 
use it, but does not give a full account of the revolt. 
Together the two revolts of Thasos and Samos indicate the 
growth of Athenian power during the Pentecontaetia. Thucyd-
ides reports the length of each, though of no other Athenian 
sieges. Thasos, a strong island, was brought to its knees after a 
two-year siege; 76 a generation later in only nine months Pericles 
was able to reduce Samos, perhaps the most powerful of the 
islands, one that in the previous century had ruled the Aegean.!7 
V. The Catalogue of Athenian Activity 
On first encountering the second part of the Pentecontaetia 
(chapters 97-117), the reader is struck by the relentless accumu-
lation of episodes illustrating Athenian dynamism. Time and 
again the Athenians acted decisively, risking large forces, often 
suffering devasting losses, yet never hesitating to reembark, or 
to face again an enemy who had defeated them. 
The navy was the basis of Athenian strength. The Penteconta-
etia overflows with notices of naval expeditions, sea battles, and 
marine landings, whether successful or not. Thucydides lists 
eight major naval battles, often including the number of ships 
involved: Eurymcdon (200 Phoenician ships captured or de-
stroyed with a land battle as well); Thasos; Cecryphaleia in the 
76 The siege of Naxos (cf Thuc. 1.137.2 and Hornblower, Comm. ad loc.) is 
given less prominence, perhaps because Thucydides did not see it as a major 
military effort. 
77 Cf also Thuc. 8.76.4; Pluto Per. 28.7. Note that the siege of Mytilene lasted 
less than a year (3.6, 26-27.1), despite the Peloponnesian invasion of Attica in 
427. The siege of Potidaea was longer, from ca September-October 432 to 
winter 430/429 (1.64.1f; 2.70). 
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Saronic Gulf; Aegina (a vauJ..laxia ... J..lEYclATJ. with allies partici-
pating on both sides and 70 ships taken); Cypriote Salamis (ca 
140 Athenian ships, again combined with a land battle), Tragia 
(44 Athenian ships against 70 Samian, of which 20 were troop 
ships); Samos (65 Athenian and allied ships against an unknown 
number of Samian ships, an Athenian defeat); and Samos again 
(some 215 Athenian and allied ships).78 In this period, the 
Spartans fought no naval battles; their allies fought only two, at 
Cecryphaleia and Aegina. Thucydides notes as well other naval 
expeditions not involving major battles: the 200 ships sent from 
Cyprus to Egypt, later supplemented by another SO, all of 
which apparently perished, Tolmides' circumnavigation of the 
Peloponnesus, Pericles' Corinthian Gulf expedition, another 
fleet of 60 ships to Egypt, and the 60 ships with which Pericles 
went to meet the Phoenician threat.l9 The Egyptian campaign 
was consciously telescoped (el 1.109.1), yet even so the striking 
defeats of the besieged navy and of the relief force are brought 
vividly before the reader. The fact that the campaign ended in 
disaster only strengthens the narrative's picture of the 
Athenians' irrepressible dynamism. 80 
Thanks to their navy, the Athenians were city-takers: after 
Sestos, Thucydides lists Eion, Carystus, Naxos, Ennea Hodoi, 
Thasos, Memphis in Egypt, Aegina, Corinthian Chalcis, Delphi, 
Chaeronea, Hestiaea, and Samos. 81 With the exception of Del-
phi and Chaeronea, all these victories were fundamentally naval 
actions, with land troops being transported, supplied, and sup-
ported by the fleet. The Athenian attack was most often caused 
by revolts, which were crushed unmercifully, with the excep-
tion of Megara in 446. Most of the cities fell after a siege: Eion, 
Carystus, Naxos, Thasos, Aegina, Samos. Other places were 
78 Thuc. 1.100.1f, 105.1f, 112.4, 116.1, 117.1,3. Thucydidcs had noted that 
there were only two major naval battles during the Persian War, 1.23.1. 
79 Thuc. 1.1 04, 109f, 108.5, 112.2ff, 116.3. 
80 Cf the Corinthians at Thuc. 1.70.5, V1KcOJlEVQt £1t' £A.6.Xt<rtOV UV(l1tl1t'tO'U-
OlV. The exact number of ships that remained in Egypt is problematic. If the 
fifty ships were not reinforcements but replacements, as argued by H. D. 
Westlake, "Thucydides and the Athenian Disaster in Egypt," Essays on the 
Greek Historians and Greek History (Manchester 1969) 61-73 (==CP45 [1950] 
209-16) at 70, and A J. Holladay, "The Hellenic Disaster in Egypt," IllS 109 
(1989) 176-82, only about 100 ships would have been lost. 
8! 99.1, 3{; 100.3; 101.3; 104.2; 105.2 and 108.4; 108.5; 112.5; 113.1; 115.2-117. 
Other peoples or areas conquered: Scyros (99.2); Boeotia, Phocis, Opuntian 
Locris (108.3); Euboea (114.3). 
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beseiged but not taken: Leukon Teichos in Egypt, Oiniadai, 
Citium (1.104.2, 111.3, 112.4). In this whole period, according to 
Thucydides' narrative, Sparta was able to make only one major 
conquest, the rebels of Ithome, after nine years. In two minor 
actions she won back one Dorian polisma from Phocis (107.2) 
and briefly gained control of Delphi (112.5). 
The narrative regularly pauses to record the terms of capitu-
lation of the conquered cities. Especially when measured against 
the outcome of the Messenian revolt, these terms tend to illus-
trate how the victories augmented Athenian resources. On dif-
ferent occasions, conquered cities were forced to: (1) surren-
der their ships (Thasos, Aegina, Samos, and by implication 
Naxos), (2) pay reparations (Thasos, Samos), (3) pay tribute 
(Thasos, Aegina), (4) give hostages (Opuntian Locris, Samos),82 
(5) tear down their walls (Thasos, Tanagra, Aegina, Samos), and 
(6) lose territory (Thasos) or their city (Hestiaea). In a few cases, 
the population was enslaved (Eion, Scyros, Chaeronea).83 In par-
ticular, the narrative emphasizes the complete subjection of the 
major islands, Thasos, Aegina, and Samos. 
Athens' insistence on destroying the walls of cities considered 
dangerous conforms to Thucydides' own conception of walls as 
an element of power (c{ supra n.35). The Spartans wanted to 
prevent construction of the Athenian city walls, as later their 
sympathizers hoped to stop the building of the long walls 
(1.90.1f, 107.4). Rebuilding the walls in 479-478 initiated Athens' 
rise to empire, as the destruction of the long walls and those of 
the Peiraeus in 404 marked Athens' defeat. The narrative re-
cords also the construction of the Peiraeus walls (93), the long 
walls (107.1, 108.3), and the long walls of Megara (103.4).84 Me-
gara and Nisaia were eventually lost, but the fortifications that 
made Athens a unit with the Peiraeus were fundamental to 
Pericles' strategy for confronting the Spartans. 
Important as naval actions are in these chapters, the frequent 
notices of Athenian land battles also seize the attention of the 
reader. Often the Athenian force had debarked from ships to 
82 The Samians twice: 1.115.3, 117.3. 
83 I doubt that Thucydides' list of terms is complete; it probably represents 
those elements that strike him as especially important for a given occasion. 
84 R. P. Legan notes that the walls were probably not begun immediately 
after Megara's alliance with Athens (Megara [Ithaca 1981] 185). Thucydides 
supplies the information when Megara enters the Athenian sphere, not 
necessarily in its chronological position. 
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confront a local enemy: in the various sieges, but also at the 
Eurymedon, in Egypt (an eventual defeat), at Halieis (a defeat), 
on Tolmides' periplous (at the Spartan shipyard, at Corinthian 
Chalcis, and at Sicyon), under Pericles at Sicyon (1,000 hoplites), 
and at Salamis on Cyprus. 85 The generals, however, frequently 
undertook land expeditions involving significant hoplite forces. 
At Tanagra, 14,000 Athenian and allied hoplites, treacherously 
accompanied by Thessalian cavalry, fought against 1,500 Lace-
daemonian and at least 10,000 allied hoplites, a defeat redeemed 
sixty-two days later by the striking victory at Oinophyta. 86 
Other expeditions went to Thessaly, to Delphi, and to Boeotia, 
where 1,000 Athenian hoplites, supported by the allies, won a 
victory at Chaeronea and then met a stunning defeat at 
Coronea. Finally in 446 Pericles led an army to Euboea, which 
had revolted, back to the Megarian border to face a Pelopon-
nesian invasion, and once more to Euboea to put down the 
revolt (1.111.1, 112.5, 113, 114). 
To list so fully the individual actions described in the Pente-
contaetia is perhaps tedious to those quite familiar with this text 
and these events. But it is exactly the narrative's strikingly long 
and bare catalogue that creates the meaning of this section of the 
excursus. If we as readers disengage ourselves from the account 
and attempt to reorganize it, to establish a chronological frame-
work, to ask for the policy and debate behind individual actions, 
the pursuit of these objectives, eminently useful in themselves, 
separates us from the peculiar power of the narrative. Thucyd-
ides' staccato account forces the reader to note again and again 
Athens' resolve and acceptance of risk in mounting individual 
and multiple operations: "The impression that emerges from 
the Pentecontaetia is of the restless energy of the Athenians" 
(Connor [supra n.66] 45). These factors generated the fear 
among the Peloponnesians and in Sparta that led to the war, and 
proved extremely important in the course of the war. 87 
85 Thuc. 1.100.1, 104.2 and 109.4-110.4, 105.1, 108.5, 111.2, 112.4. Other 
sources credit Tolmides with addtional conquests: Diod. 11.84; Aeschin. 2.75 
and L; Paus. 1.27.5. 
86 Thuc. 1.107.2-108.1, 108.2f. These are Thucydides' figures, but we may 
expect that additional Boeotians joined the Peloponnesian expeditionary force 
when battle was anticipated in Boeotia. 
87 Compare especially the Athenians' behavior at the time of the siege of 
Aegina with their refusal to lift the sieges of Potidaea or Mytilene despite the 
Spartan invasions, even the very severe one in 427 (2.70; 3.16£, 26). 
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Particularly at the time of the Egyptian campaign-the central 
and the most elaborately organized element of Thucydides' nar-
rative-Athens' multiple commitments overwhelm the reader 
as they overwhelmed the Peloponnesians. Thucydides implies 
that while 200 Athenian and allied ships were engaged in Egypt, 
besieging and later being besieged, Athens fought the Corin-
thians at Halieis and soon, even though they were defeated in 
that battle, fought again at Cecryphaleia, then dared a major sea 
battle with the Aeginetans and their allies. While still committed 
in Egypt, they determined to besiege Aegina, and sent their 
youths and old men to confront and gain the upper hand against 
the Corinthians in the Megarid-and only twelve days later, 
they marched out again to defend their trophy, rout the enemy, 
and trap and slaughter a significant portion of the Corinthian 
force (105.3-106).88 With their force still trapped in Egypt, the 
narrative continues, they began and completed the long walls, 
continued the siege of Aegina and finally forced Aegina's 
capitulation, fought the battles of Tanagra and Oenophyta, and 
sent Tolmides around the Peloponnese. 89 The Athenian and 
allied force in Egypt was finally crushed, yet the Athenians still 
went on to mount expeditions to Thessaly and the Corinthian 
Gulf. 90 
No wonder Thucydides had the Corinthians say with amaze-
ment and anger, "they dare beyond their strength and risk be-
yond good sense, expecting the best in the midst of danger," 
and allowed Pericles to boast, "no enemy has ever encountered 
our full strength, since we simultaneously attend to our navy 
and dispatch land forces on many operations" (1.70.3, 2.39.3). 
The ability of the Athenians to undertake so many enterprises 
88 Contemporaries were also impressed by their commitment and its cost. 
ef. ML 33 (/ G F 929), a magnificent funeral stele recording a total of 178 men, 
including two generals, lost from a single tribe (Erechtheis) in Cyprus, Egypt, 
Phoenicia, Halieis, Aegina, and Megara, and another recently discovered stele, 
perhaps contemporaneous, with the names of the fallen of Aigeis, S E G 
XXXIV 45, XXXVII 50. 
89 Note that for the whole period of the Pentecontaetia Thucydides records 
only three Spartan expeditions: to Doris, when they were trapped in Boeotia 
and forced to fight at Tanagra (a victory soon cancelled at Oenophyta); to 
Delphi (immediately annulled by Athenian action); and to Eleusis, whence 
they withdrew without a fight (1.1 07f, 112.5, 114.2). Most of the fighting seems 
to have been undertaken by Sparta's allies. 
90 This continuity is indicated clearly in the Greek of 11 0.4-111.1, where the 
Egyptian disaster is summarized in a me n -clause, and the Thessalian ex-
pedition immediately follows in the de-clause. 
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demonstrates their power.91 The second part of the Pentecon-
taetia, by its telegraphic enumeration of Athenian sieges, battles, 
and expeditions by land and sea, confirms Thucydides' sum-
mary statement of the separation and confrontation of the two 
Hellenic powers and their allies after the Persian Wars (1.18.2f); 
and it provides the background for the Corinthian reproaches, 
the Athenian self-justification, and the Spartan fears reported at 
the conference at Sparta (1.67-88). Without this account both 
the Spartan decision to fight and Athenian readiness to resist 
would remain unexplained. After this narrative, the reader real-
izes that, in refusing to yield to the Spartans in 432 and asserting 
Athens' right to make its own policy, Pericles followed the path 
of Themistocles and of the preceding fifty years. 
Finally, there is yet another element that captures the reader's 
attention: suffering. ~vvuJ.nc; brings with it not only action and 
warfare but also 1tU80C;,92 and Thucydides does not hesitate to 
reveal this even in the brief limits of the Pentecontaetia. Athe-
nian defeats figure alongside their victories, and the harshness 
of imperialism-slavery-is starkly presented. 93 Two episodes 
especially stand out: the 1tu80c; IlEYU of the Corinthians in the 
Megarid (106.2) and the disaster in Egypt. The Corinthian epi-
sode is doubly important, because it represented as well the 
heroic effort of an overcommitted city. Thucydides highlights 
the passage with historical presents (ucpt1(vouv'tUt, 8tucp8d-
pOUCH), the unusual report of Corinthian sentiment after the 
first defeat, the specification of the interval of twelve days 
within which the Athenians were called upon to fight a second 
time, and finally the horrible end of the "not insignificant 
portion" of the Corinthian force, trapped and stoned to death. 94 
91 Cf. H. R. Immerwahr, "Thucydides and the Pathology of Power," in 
Stadter (supra n.14) 18: for Thucydides "[power] leads to constant activity .... 
Thucydides sees power as a force which nourishes, perpetuates, and increases 
itself in constant progression." 
92 The tie between war and pathos is made explicit at 1.23 but is implicit 
throughout Thucydides' history, as it was already in Homer. Cf. Immerwahr 
(supra n.91) 22, and for Homer, cf. e.g. G. Nagy, The Best of the Achaeans 
(Baltimore 1979) 69-93. The greatness of the war, which resulted from the 
power and preparedness of the combatants (1.1.1, 18.2-19), brought with it 
enormous suffering. 
93 The Athenians' actions lead to two types of slavery, sale of captives 
(1.98.1£, 113.1) and subjection of allies (1.9804). 
94 The first example of the slaughter in a closed place that Thucydides found 
so impressive: see Connor (supra n.66) 200 with nAO. 
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The shift of fortunes in Egypt is also signalled by historical 
presents (ltEJlltEl at 109.2f) and the unusually long sentence at 
109.3f describing Megabyzus' energetic and ingenious seizure of 
the Greek position on the island. The disaster is summarized in 
a contrastingly short sentence (ou'tw ... ltOAEJlTtO'av'ta), and 
pathetically amplified in the following phrase, OAtYOt cmo 
ltOAArov ... EO'w81laav, 01. 8E ltAElO''tOt cXltWAOV'tO. Inarus was 
betrayed and crucified, and the relief force of fifty ships fell to 
the enemy: 8tEq>8Elpav 'tae; ltOAAae; 'troy VEroV, a1. 8' EAaO'O'ou<; 
8tEq>UYOV ltaAtv. The final sentence reminds us once more that 
this was an Athenian disaster: "In this way ended the great 
expedition of the Athenians and their allies in Egypt." Other 
major slaughters are also noted, as at Tanagra (q>ovo<; £rEVE'tO 
cXJlq>O'tEPWV) and Coronea ('tOue; JlEV 8tEq>8npav 'troy 'A81lvatwV, 
'toue; 8E ~rov'tae; £Aa~ov). 95 The significant clement of pathos in 
imperial achievement is perhaps the reason for mentioning the 
disaster at Drabeskos, even though it seems to have occurred 
some years after the revolt of Thasos. The suffering of these 
fifty years, another sign of greatness, points toward the greater 
suffering of the war.96 The lta8TtJla'ta have a paradigmatic 
quality, as does so much of this excursus: the Corinthian pathos 
seems to foreshadow especially the slaughter of the Athenians 
at the Assinarus (7.84), as the fate of the Egyptian expedition 
foreshadows that of the expedition to Sicily. In addition, the 
suffering inflicted and endured by the Athenians was an 
additional factor behind the Spartan decision in 432. The 
Corinthian disaster would have dismayed the Spartans and 
exacerbated Corinthian hostility, while Athenian refusal to curb 
their activity even after Egypt or Coronea would only have 
increased Spartan fear. That fear would have made them more 
receptive to the Corinthian reproaches in the Congress at 
Sparta. 
VI. Omissions 
The review of the contents of the Pentecontaetia and their 
effect on the reader permits a rather different evaluation of the 
95 At Coronea, note also the use of the historical present, EnttiOfV'tal. 
96 Herodotus saw this period also as a time of suffering (Hdt. 6.98.2). 
Pericles' Funeral Speech is a celebration of the choice that the Athenians made 
in being willing to die for the power of their city (cf esp. 2.42f) and alludes as 
well to the suffering their actions brought to others (2.41.4). 
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omissions that are such a significant and often lamented feature 
of the text. The chief reason for considering the excursus incom-
plete, hasty, and biased is its silence on so many events, often of 
major importance, which one might expect to be treated even 
in an abbreviated account of the period 479-432. 97 But in the 
body of his history Thucydides also omits much that would 
interest a modern historian: economic and social history, per-
sonal histories of leading figures, etc. Here, however, I shall 
consider only omissions of categories that Thucydides regularly 
reported in the body of his work. Because the Pentecontaetia-
especially the second part-is episodic, a list rather than an inter-
pretative account, the very selection of items directs the reader. 
In the same way, omissions may be seen as defining for the 
reader the purpose of the narrative. The absence of the fol-
lowing categories helps us delimit more precisely the purpose 
of the excursus. 
(1) Chronological Framework. Perhaps the most significant 
lack for the modern reader is the absence of any internal chron-
ological or conceptual framework in the second part of the 
narrative (100-17). This is a question of method rather than of 
individual gaps, in marked contrast to Thucydides' methodol-
ogy in Books III-IV, with its rigid sequence of years, neatly 
divided into summers and winters. In the Pentecontaetia time 
references float free, 98 with no relation, as in modern histories, 
to such entities as the "First Pcloponnesian War" or the 
"Second Sacred War" to help the reader conceptualize events. 
The absence of chronological indications is in fact characteristic 
of the whole first book from the Archaeology on, and not 
limited to the Pentecontaetia. Thucydides offers no dates for 
e.g. the stasis at Epidamnus, the battles of Leukimme or Sybota, 
the events in Potidaea, or the Megarian decrees.99 The only clear 
date, set relative to the conclusion of the Thirty Years Peace, is 
97 The omissions have been frequently remarked. See especially the long but 
still incomplete list compiled by Gomme, !lCT I 365-89. 
98 Cf Gomme, HCT I 362: "Between these limits his events float like sticks 
in water in an oblong bowl, preserving their relative order, but none of them 
with a fixed position in relation to the ends of the bowl and but few of them 
relatively to each other," although I do not agree with Gomme that all events 
are in chronological order. Some of the dates can be established by statements 
outside the Pentecontaetia, but within the excursus the exercise does not 
interest Thucydides. Cf Andrewes, HCT V 381. 
99 Similarly also the narratives of Cy lon, Pausanias, and Themistocles, 
1.126-38. 
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at 1.87.6: the Spartan decision was made in the fourteenth year 
of the treaty.lOO The standard explanation has been that 
Thucydides wanted and was able to give a precise chronological 
framework, but for some reason did not. lOl Another theory, 
noting the imprecision of oral memory, suggests that he was 
able to assign dates to very few events, especially before the 
mid-century, but recorded those that were remembered. lo2 
When the war broke out in 431, however, Thucydides was 
already an interested and sophisticated observer, and it certainly 
would have been possible for him to construct from the oral 
memory of the older generation a fairly clear chronological 
scheme for the fifty years preceding. The fact is, he does not 
give dates even for events, such as the Corcyraean episode, of 
which he was a contemporary observer. A more straightfor-
ward hypothesis, and one more in keeping with the evidence of 
the text, is that Thucydides did not wish to give a precise 
chronological structure to his account because he considered 
such a structure irrelevant to or even distracting from the 
points he was trying to make. lo3 There are only ten precise 
statements of duration in the Pentecontaetia: two specify the 
length of the first and last major sieges (101.3, 117.3), three the 
unusually short intervals between pairs of Athenian actions 
(105.6, 108.2, 117.1), two the length of time the Greeks were 
able to hold out against Megabyzus and the total length of the 
Egyptian campaign (109.4, 110.1), one the length of the siege of 
Ithome (103.1), and two the intervals of inaction before the five-
year treaty and after the thirty-year treaty (112.1,115.2). Finally, 
Thucydides gives a round number for the whole period: 
roughly fifty years (118.2). In none of these cases does 
Thucydides try to tie these intervals into a larger chronological 
framework: each is given to reinforce the themes of the 
100 The treaty itself is later (at 2.2.1) dated fifteen years before the beginning 
of the war, but not when it is mentioned at 1.115.1. 
101 Comme writes, e.g., that Thucydides intended to write "a succinct, 
annalistic narrative of datable events" but that "cc. 99-113 are very far from 
fulfilling that intention" (HCr I 389). If annalistic means "year by year" or 
"precisely dated by (archon or other) year," there is absolutely no evidence for 
such a desire in the text. 
102 Badian, From Piataea 74 (=[1988] 291). 
103 Cf Westlake 42. Note that Herodotus also used a quite different chrono-
logical method for the account of Xerxes' invasion (winter and summer 
campaigning seasons year by year) from that in the 'preliminary' books on 
the expansion of Persia. 
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excursus, as has been indicated above. These certainly are not 
the only dates or intervals that Thucydides knew (cf Gomme, 
Hey I 389ff); the presumption should be that they are those 
that he thought useful to his readers. 
The narrative is presented in roughly chronological order, as 
the frequent use of JlE'tU 'ta1)"[a and UO"'tEPOV attests. Other prin-
ciples of order, however, are also at work, as seen in the discus-
sion of the Thasian and Messenian revolts and the analysis of 
1.104-10.104 The recognition that some incidents are intro-
duced out of chronological order to keep topics together or to 
reinforce a point should offer no difficulty (e.g. the disaster at 
Drabescus and the fall of !thorne). It was undoubtedly Thucy-
dides' intention to improve upon Hellanicus (97.2), but the 
precise manner in which this was accomplished cannot be deter-
mined in the face of our total ignorance of Hellanicus' treatment 
of this period. 105 
(2) Diplomatic Events, such as Embassies and Treaties. 
Obvious omissions are the oaths and terms of the Delian 
League and the treaty between Sparta and Argos, but also lesser 
items such as the treaties between Athens and Egesta, Leontini, 
Rhegion, and Phocis, and undoubtedly many other cities. l06 
Thucydides refers to the Hellenic alliance continuing from the 
Persian Wars in establishing the initial relation between Athens 
104 Note also the flashback at 93.3 (1tpO'tEPOV) and the anticipation at 98.4 
(£1tEt'tU) and references to contemporaneous events at 89.3, 91.3, 95.3, 100.3, 
107.1, and 109.1. Cf e.g. McNeal; Badian, From Piataea (ef especially 79f the 
example from Thuc. 4.50 ) and Lewis (supra n.71) 500. The contrary view is set 
out most firmly by AT L III 162 that Thucydides' improvement (over Hel-
lanicus' account) "is to set events in proper order. It is our belief that in his 
excursus Thucydides has done this without any deviation whatever." 
105 Only fragments 323a F 28 (Salamis, 480 B.C.), T8 (=F12, Thuc. 1.97.2), and 
F25f (407/406 B.C.) are securely referable to Hellanicus' fifth-century account. 
Despite much discussion, no certain conclusion is possible: cf Andrewes, 
HCT V 381. Thucydides' emphasis on the simultaneity of the Egyptian 
expedition and the actions reported in 1.105-08, e.g., may be a corrective to 
Hellanicus. The account would have had to be quite short, perhaps only a few 
pages, and may have been available to Thucydides-and to others-before it 
reached its final form. For recent treatments, cf R. J. Lenardon, "Thucydides 
and Hellanicus," in G. S. Shrimpton and D. J. McCargar, edd., Classical 
Contributions. Studies in Honour of M. F. McGregor (Locust Valley [N.Y.] 
1981) 59-70; J. D. Smart, "Thucydides and Hellanicus," in 1. S. Moxon, J. D. 
Smart, and A. J. Woodman, edd., Past Perspectives: Studies in Greek and 
Roman Historical Writing (Cambridge 1986) 19-35. 
106 Thucydides knew of the Spartan-Argive treaty: cf 4.14.4. We possess 
only a fraction of Athens' treaties with poleis within and outside her empire. 
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and Sparta (1.89.2), and Athens' decision to withdraw from the 
alliance and establish alliances with Argos and Thessaly (1.102.4), 
the beginning of overt differences between the two leading 
powers. The two treaties between Athens and Sparta are men-
tioned, but with one exception nothing is said of their terms or 
conditions except how long the treaties were to last. In each 
case the treaties serve to explain brief periods of Athenian 
quiet. 10l Further, Thucydides mentions Athens' surrender of 
Nisaea, Pegae, and Troezen in the terms of the Thirty Years' 
Peace, not as a part of a full account of treaty terms, but to indi-
cate that Athens was withdrawing from these Dorian terri-
tories, as after Coronea she had withdrawn from Boeotia. Given 
his silence on treaties, there is no basis for arguing that Thucy-
dides duplicitously suppressed the terms of the Peace of Calli as 
or of the Thirty Years Peace,108 or that his silence is an argu-
ment against the Peace of Callias or the Congress Decree. 109 
The exception to this and the following category is chapters 90-
95, the account of how Athens got the hegemony. The planning 
and diplomatic maneuvers of both Athens and Sparta on that 
occasion are set out in some detail, as has been noted. The 
silence on the Peace of Callias reflects also Thucydides' general 
disinterest in the role of Persia, and therefore of Athenian 
relations to Persia, which is a significant weakness of his treat-
ment not only of the Pentecontaetia, but of the whole war 
down to 411. He consistently sees the period from 479 to 411 in 
terms of Spartan-Athenian relations, so that even the battle of 
the Eurymedon, the Egyptian campaign, and the intervention of 
107 The treaties at 1.112.1, 115.1; the quiet periods at 112.2, "the Athenians 
refrained from war in Greece" and 115.2 "in the sixth year .... " The two 
chronological notices at 1.112.1 and 1.115.2 serve to delimit further the periods 
of Athenian tranquillity, not to locate the treaties within a temporal grid. 
108 Pace Badian, From Plataea 134 (Peace of Callias), 137-45 (Thirty Years' 
Peace) (=[1990] 57,61-71). 
109 Thucydides' silence has made the authenticity of both highly prob-
lematic, yet from the nature of the Pentecontaetia there is no reason to expect 
that he would have reported them. For recent discussions and references to 
earlier work, see Badian, "The Peace of Callias," in From Plataea 1-72 
(expanded and updated from his article in ]HS 107 [1987] 1-39) and Meiggs 
(supra n.3) 205-19. 
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Pissouthnes in the Samian War are seen in terms of Athenian 
activity, not of the Persian danger.110 
(3) Debates on Policy or its Implementation. The only excep-
tion is Themistocles' case for constructing the walls of Athens 
and of the Peiraeus. We can imagine many debates at Athens, 
some of which are mentioned by other authors: whether to 
seize the opportunity to supplant Sparta in the Aegean, or to 
help Sparta in the 460s, or to aid Inarus in Egypt, or to accept 
the Thirty Years' Peace. All these serious and difficult q ues-
tions, and similar ones for Sparta and the other cities,111 Thucyd-
ides passes over in silence: the intellectual and emotional factors 
of war, depicted so vividly for the war and its immediate 
antecedents, have no place here. ll2 
(4) Internal Politics. There is nothing in the excursus on the 
ostracisms of Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, or Thucydides 
the son of Melasias, on the democratic reforms, or on the build-
ing debate, or on internal politics or debates in Sparta or other 
states. The reference to pro-Laconian elements in Athens 
(107.4ff) explains the Athenian decision to confront the Spartans 
in Boeotia, rather than factional politics at Athens. No mention 
is made of Cimon's presence at the battle, or the role of the olig-
archic opposition in these years. The Laconian earthquake, with 
all its disastrous effect on Spartan internal and external policy, is 
cited simply as the factor that blocked Spartan aid to Thasos and 
permitted the helot revolt. 
(5) Imperial Measures Not Involving Significant Military 
Actions. The Pentecontaetia is silent on individual synods of the 
League, the movement of the treasury to Athens, minor rebel-
lions and uprisings, special regulations and administrative mea-
sures, adjustments to tribute, and other imperial decisions and 
actions. Treatment of the empire as such is limited to chapters 
96-99, which sketch succinctly two of the instruments by 
which Athens established its hegemony and broadened its 
110 For this reason, and in the light of 1. 90-95, it is probably best to interpret 
the ufear" spoken of by the Athenians at 1.76, as fear of Sparta, not of Persia. 
Cf. also supra n.45 
111 E.g. consideration of the Samian and Mytilenean requests for aid to their 
actual or potential revolts (cf. Thuc. 1.41.2,3.2.1). 
112 Rawlings (supra n.27: 74) notes that Athenian policy is never explained 
in Book I, until Pericles' first speech; the reader is given only Athenian 
actions, though 1.44 and 90-95 arc exceptions to this rule. Strong emotion, 
especially fear, is however implicit throughout the Pentecontaetia, and in a 
particular way in the pathos passages already discussed. 
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power: tribute income and the navy. The tribute was admin-
istered by Athenian magistrates, and treaty obligations were 
rigidly enforced by the navy.ll3 
(6) Cleruchies and Foundations of Cities. Thucydides omits 
the foundations of Brea, Thurii, Amphipolis, and the cleruchies 
or colonists sent to the Chersonese, N axos, Andros, Sinope, 
Amisos, and elsewhere. The colony at Ennea Hodoi is men-
tioned as part of the response to the rebellion of Thasos, but the 
attempt to establish a colony there immediately following the 
fall of Eion (L ad Aeschin. 2.31) has no place here. The cleruchy 
to Hestiaea (1.114.5) was part of the punishment of that city. 
(7) Naval Expeditions That Did Not Have Significant Military 
Engagements. E.g. Ephialtes' expedition beyond the Chelido-
nian islands (Plut. Per. 19.1,20.1£).114 Thucydides' casual refer-
ence to the two hundred ships "which happened to be on cam-
paign in Cyprus" and were sent to Egypt (104.2) is a reminder 
of Athens' constant naval operations. Phormio's expedition 
with thirty ships to Acarnania, which helped the Acarnanians 
and Amphilochians take and resettle Amphilochian Argos, 
might have been included but perhaps involved neither a sig-
nificant battle nor direct capture of the city by Athens. 
(8) Actions of Other Cities That Did Not Directly Involve 
A thens. This would include the troubles that Sparta had intern-
ally and with its neighbors, especially Argos and Arcadia,115 des-
pite the importance that these held for Sparta's lack of resistance 
to Athens. 
The narrative we possess is rigorously selective. After the 
first section sketching Athens' rise to hegemony, it concen-
trates on actions, not debate, on battles, not treaties. Athenian 
activity expressed its power and was sufficient explanation for 
Sparta's fear. The silence on events between the Samian War 
and the Corcyrean conflict that has so troubled scholars can be 
in large part explained under the categories listed here, although 
other factors may be at work as well. In particular, the Samian 
War represented the most frightening and determined display 
113 Thucydides is silent on many other ways by which Athens managed the 
empire, for which see Meiggs (supra n.3) 205-19. 
114 This category would include as well the prior expedition of Cimon to 
Sparta, if it took place (Plut. Cim. 16.8ff; cf Ar. Lys. 1138-41 and Badian, 
From P/ataea 89-95 (=[1988] 304-10), and the Athenian contingent at the 
battle of Oinoe. 
115 Cf Thuc. 1.118.2; Hdt. 9.35; Diod. 11.65; Lewis (supra n.71) 104-08, 120. 
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of Athenian strength; nothing that followed could overshadow 
it or reinforce its import. Thucydides apparently preferred to 
end his excursus with this dramatic act, rather than trail off in a 
series of events of lesser significance. The war was waiting to 
happen. 116 
VII. Conclusion 
The foregoing analysis indicates that the Pentecontaetia is 
neither incomplete nor poorly thought out, but an organized 
narrative that effectively sets out the major factors that led to 
the Spartan decison of 432, reported at 1.87. Different forms of 
narrative present (1) the decisive Athenian effort in rebuilding 
their walls and assuming hegemony in the Aegean after the 
destruction of their city, and (2) their dynamism in the years 
that followed, displaying their incredible energy, in losses, as 
well as remarkable successes. The two major sections, 89-95 
and 98-117, are markedly diverse in style and degree of detail be-
cause the two parts serve different functions within the excur-
sus, so that the same technique was not suitable for both. The 
Athenian arche is not in itself the subject of the excursus, but 
represents the principal means, as set out in cc. 96-99, by which 
Athens was able to acquire the resources that rermitted and in-
spired this incessant activity. The purpose 0 the excursus, as 
derived from context and content, is to indicate how the estab-
lishment and increase of Athenian power, seen in terms of their 
dynamic activity, give the Spartans cause to fear. The omissions 
are consistent with this purpose and thus cannot be used as 
evidence of incompleteness or of authorial intention to deceive 
or mislead. 
The Pentecontaetia narrative develops and clarifies many of 
the themes present in the earlier sections of Book I, especially 
those of the Archaeology and of the debate at Sparta. Its 
account of Athenian power, based on walls and navy, rclate 
directly to the analysis of power in the Archaeology and the 
complex interrelation of surplus wealth, walls, naval strength, 
and the subjection of weaker communities. 117 First the Kerky-
116 Cf Thuc. 1.44.2 for the Athenian attitude. The Corcyraean and Corin-
thian statements are clearly self-serving: 1.33.3, 36.1,42.2. 
117 Cf the summary passage at 1.8.3, but also passages such as 11.1; 13.1, 6; 
14.3. Minos, Pelops and Agamemnon, and Polycrates provide earlier instances 
of the same combination. Cf also de Romilly (supra n.38) esp. 260-73; P. R. 
STADTER, PHILIP, The Form and Content of Thucydides' Pentecontaetia (1.89-117) , Greek, 
Roman and Byzantine Studies, 34:1 (1993:Spring) p.35 
70 THUCYDIDES' PENTECONTAETIA 
raika and Poteideatika, then the speeches at Sparta set out the 
themes of navy, imperial action, hegemonic ambition, and the 
different styles of Athens and Sparta. After the vote at Sparta, as 
Connor has acutely remarked (supra n.66: 41), the reader is 
filled with questions about the previous interaction of Athens 
and Sparta, and is especially desirous of a fuller account than that 
presented by the Athenian speakers of Athens' assumption of 
hegemony and its behavior as a leader.11s 
The excursus addresses the "truest reason"-the growth of 
Athenian power that frightened the Spartans-and brings its nar-
rative down to the Samian War, after which, as Walker observes 
(32), the "account of the formal cause (beginning with the 
Corcyra episode) can itself, as an account of activity which 
caused complaint, present the reader by implication with an 
account of Athenian growth which caused alarm." The 
excursus also prepares the reader for the war narrative that 
follows: the ineffectiveness of the Spartan invasions of Attica, 
the willingness of the Athenians to endure the sufferings of 
being cooped within the walls and of the plague, and their ability 
to mount more than one large enterprise simultaneously.119 
The Pentecontaetia does not paint a rosy and unrealistic pic-
ture of Athenian nobility and goodwill in the time preceding the 
Peloponnesian War, in an attempt to justify the war to a genera-
tion disillusioned by the defeat of 404,120 but draws a strikingly 
clear-eyed, even harsh, picture of Athenian ambition and use of 
Pouncy, The Necessities of War: A Study of Thucydides' Pessimism (New 
York 1980) 45-53. 
118 Cf 1.75, the acquistion of the hegemony; 1.76, the natural ambition to 
rule; and 1.77, Athenian and Spartan treatment of subject allies. Cf Connor 
(supra n.66) 46: "The Pentecontaetia thus forges a link between the quanti-
tative analysis of power in the Archaeology and the emphasis on national 
characteristics in the Corinthian speech at Sparta." 
119 E.g. Pericles' massive expedition to Epidaurus, while maintaining the 
siege of Potidaea. 
120 Cf on Thucydides' "last redaction" E. Schwartz, Das Geschichtswerk 
des Thukydides1 (Hildesheim 1960) 113, 133, 157f; Badian, From Piataea 73f 
(=[1988] 290f), "'Thucydides and the Outbreak," passim. The cursory treat-
ment of Athens' greatest victory against the Persians, at the Eurymedon, the 
crushing of Thasos and Samos, with no reference to diplomacy or discussion, 
and the mention of pro-Spartan sentiment at the time of Tanagra hardly seem 
to support the idea of the excursus as an apologia for Athenian policy: a much 
better case could have been made. He might, e.g., have been more explict here 
on the Spartan sense of being in the wrong, indicated only at 7.18.2. 
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power. Nevertheless, glorification of Athens is a distinct ele-
ment of the excursus. Like the Funeral Speech, it celebrates the 
energy and self-sacrifice of the Athenian people, at the same 
time that it permits us to observe the darker side of the imperial-
istic urge. The empire is an object of hate, but also a source of 
eternal glory, as Pericles reminded the Athenians in his last 
speech (2.64.5). The reader is invited to wonder at the indom-
itable drive of the Athenians, while noting the horrible casual-
ties and the enslavement of supposedly autonomous states. 
Like the Funeral Speech, the Pentecontaetia is both glorious 
and melancholy, for they both share the tragic vision of the 
human condition that lay at the foundation of Thucydides' view 
of empire and war. 
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7tOAAC!> uatEpOv 
21. 112.1 five-year treaty uattpov of. OtaAt7tOV-
trov £trov tptrov 
22. 112.2ff Cyprus lea1. ... f:~ of. Ku7tpov 
23. 112.5 Delphi J\aleEOatj.lOVWt of. /lEtU 
tauta 
24. 113.1-4 Chaeronea-Coronea leal. xp6vou f:yyrvollEvOU 
j.lEtU tauto. 
25. 114.1ff Euboea- Eleusis IlftU of. tauta ou 
7tOAAC!> UatEpOv 
26. 115.1 30-year treaty avaxroPtlaavtr~ ... ou 
7tOAAC!> uatrpov 
27. 115.2-117.3 Samos EletCfl of. £tft 
